Rethinking Softmax Cross-Entropy Loss for Adversarial Robustness by Pang, Tianyu et al.
Rethinking Softmax Cross-Entropy Loss
for Adversarial Robustness
Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Yinpeng Dong, Chao Du, Ning Chen, Jun Zhu∗
Dept. of Comp. Sci. & Tech., Institute for AI, Tsinghua-Fuzhou Inst. for Data Tech.
BNRist Center, THBI Lab, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
{pty17, xu-k16, dyp17, du-c14}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, {ningchen, dcszj}@tsinghua.edu.cn
Abstract
Previous work shows that adversarially robust generalization requires larger sample
complexity, and the same dataset, e.g., CIFAR-10, which enables good standard
accuracy may not suffice to train robust models. Since collecting new training data
could be costly, we instead focus on inducing locally dense sample distribution,
i.e., high sample density in the feature space which could lead to locally sufficient
samples for robust learning. We first formally show that the softmax cross-entropy
(SCE) loss and its variants induce inappropriate sample density distributions in
the feature space, which inspires us to design appropriate training objectives.
Specifically, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss to create high-
density regions for better robustness. It encourages the learned features to gather
around the preset class centers with optimal inter-class dispersion. Comparing to
the SCE loss and its variants, we empirically demonstrate that applying the MMC
loss can significantly improve robustness even under strong adaptive attacks, while
keeping state-of-the-art accuracy on clean inputs with little extra computation.
1 Introduction
The deep neural networks (DNNs) trained by the softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss have achieved
state-of-the-art performance on various tasks [17]. However, in terms of robustness, the SCE loss is
not sufficient to lead to satisfactory performance of the trained models. It has been widely recognized
that the DNNs trained by the SCE loss are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [3, 18, 31, 36, 37, 43],
where human imperceptible perturbations can be crafted to fool a high-performance network.
To improve adversarial robustness of classifiers, various kinds of defenses have been proposed, but
many of them are quickly shown to be ineffective to the adaptive attacks, which are adapted to
the specific details of the proposed defenses [1, 4, 51]. Besides, other methods on verification and
training provably robust networks have also been proposed [10, 11, 22, 55, 56]. While these methods
are exciting, the verification process is often slow and not scalable. Thus many recent efforts have
been devoted to proposing faster verification methods [57, 58]. Among the previously proposed
defenses, the adversarial training (AT) methods can achieve state-of-the-art robustness under different
adversarial settings [28, 36, 59, 60]. These methods either directly impose the AT mechanism on
the SCE loss or add additional regularizers. Although the AT methods are relatively strong, they are
computationally expensive and could sacrifice accuracy on clean inputs [36, 60].
Schmidt et al. [46] show that the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly larger than
that of standard learning. Given the difficulty of training robust classifiers in practice, they further
postulate that the difficulty could stem from the insufficiency of training samples in the commonly
used datasets, e.g., CIFAR-10 [30]. However, collecting new suitable training data could be costly
or even impractical, thus we focus on utilizing the data samples in hand more efficiently. Note
that although the samples in the input space are unchangeable, we could instead manipulate the
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local sample distribution, i.e., sample density in the feature space via appropriate training objectives.
By inducing high-density feature regions, there would be locally sufficient samples to train robust
classifiers, which can return reliable predictions in these regions.
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Figure 1: Intuitive illusion of how training data moves and how sample density varies
in a two-dimensional feature space during the training procedure.
Similar to our attempt to induce high-
density regions in the feature space,
previous work has been proposed
to improve intra-class compactness.
Contrastive loss [19, 49] and triplet
loss [47] are two classical objectives
for this purpose, but the training iter-
ations will dramatically grow to con-
struct image pairs or triplets, which
results in slow convergence and insta-
bility. The more recently proposed
center loss [54] avoids the pair-wise
or triplet-wise computation by mini-
mizing the squared distance between
the features and the corresponding class centers. However, since the class centers are updated w.r.t.
the learned features during training, the center loss has to be jointly used with the SCE loss to seek
for a trade-off between inter-class dispersion and intra-class compactness [54]. Therefore, the center
loss cannot concentrate on inducing strong intra-class compactness to construct high-density regions
and consequently could not lead to reliable robustness, as shown in our experiments. Furthermore, in
Sec. 3, we formally analyze the sample density distribution induced by the SCE loss and its other
variants [41, 53], which demonstrates that these previously proposed objectives are also insufficient
to produce high-density regions in the feature space as we want.
In this paper, we propose a novel training objective which can explicitly induce high-density regions in
the feature space. To achieve this, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss (detailed
in Eq. (9)) as the substitute of the SCE loss. Specifically, in the MMC loss, we first preset untrainable
class centers with optimal inter-class dispersion in the feature space according to Pang et al. [41],
then we encourage the features to gather around the centers by minimizing the squared distance
similar with the center loss. The MMC loss can explicitly control the inter-class dispersion by a
single hyperparameter, and further concentrate on improving intra-class compactness in the training
procedure to induce high-density regions, as intuitively shown in Fig. 1. Behind the simple formula,
the MMC loss elegantly combines the favorable merits of the previous methods, which leads to a
considerable improvement on the adversarial robustness.
In experiments, we follow the suggestion by Carlini et al. [5] that we test under different threat models
and attacks, including the adaptive attacks [4, 23] on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 [30, 33].
The results demonstrate that our method can lead to reliable robustness of the trained models with little
extra computation, while maintaining state-of-the-art clean accuracy with faster convergence rates
compared to the SCE loss and its variants. When combined with the existing defense mechanisms,
e.g., the AT methods [36], the trained models can be further enhanced under unseen attacks, i.e., the
attacks different from the one used to craft adversarial examples for training.
2 Preliminaries
This section first provides the notations, then introduces the adversarial attacks and threat models.
2.1 Notations
In this paper, we use the lowercases to denote variables and the uppercases to denote mappings.
Let L be the number of classes, we define the softmax function S(h) : RL → RL as S(h)i =
exp(hi)/
∑L
l=1 exp(hl), i ∈ [L], where [L] := {1, · · · , L} and h is termed as logit. A deep neural
network (DNN) learns a non-linear mapping from the input x ∈ Rp to the feature z = Z(x) ∈ Rd.
One common training objective for DNNs is the softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss defined as:
LSCE(Z(x), y) = −1>y log [S(Wz + b)], (1)
for a single input-label pair (x, y), where 1y is the one-hot encoding of y and the logarithm is defined
as element-wise. Here W and b are the weight matrix and bias vector of the SCE loss, respectively.
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2.2 Adversarial attacks and threat models
Previous work has shown that adversarial examples can be easily crafted to fool DNNs [2, 39, 50].
A large amount of attacking methods on generating adversarial examples have been introduced in
recent years [1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 18, 24, 31, 36, 37, 43, 52]. Given the space limit, we try to perform a
comprehensive evaluation by considering five different threat models and choosing representative
attacks for each threat model following the suggestion by Carlini et al. [5]:
White-box l∞ distortion attack: We apply the projected gradient descent (PGD) [36] method,
which is efficient and widely studied in previous work [28, 42, 59].
White-box l2 distortion attack: We apply the C&W [3] method, which has a binary search mecha-
nism on its parameters to find the minimal l2 distortion for a successful attack.
Black-box transfer-based attack: We use the momentum iterative method (MIM) [9] that is effec-
tive on boosting adversarial transferability and won the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Competition [32].
Black-box gradient-free attack: We choose SPSA [52] since it has broken many previously pro-
posed defenses. It can still perform well even when the loss surface is difficult to optimize over.
General-purpose attack: To demonstrate that our method is generally robust, we also test the model
performance when adding Gaussian noise [13, 16] or random rotation [12] on the input images.
Furthermore, to exclude the false robustness caused by, e.g., gradient mask [1], we modify the above
attacking methods to be adaptive attacks [4, 5, 23] when evaluating on the robustness of our method.
The adaptive attacks are much more powerful than the non-adaptive ones, as detailed in Sec. 4.2.
3 Methodology
Various theoretical explanations have been developed for adversarial examples [13, 14, 25, 44, 46]. In
particular, Schmidt et al. [46] show that training robust classifiers requires significantly larger sample
complexity compared to that of training standard ones, and they further postulate that the difficulty
of training robust classifiers stems from, at least partly, the insufficiency of training samples in the
commonly used datasets. Since collecting extra training data is often non-trivial and could be costly
in many cases, it is wise to better explore the given data samples for robust learning. Although a given
sample is fixed in the input space, we can instead manipulate the local sample distribution, i.e., sample
density in the feature space, via designing appropriate training objectives. Intuitively, by inducing
high-density regions in the feature space, it can be expected to have locally sufficient samples to train
robust models that are able to return reliable predictions. In this section, we first formally define the
notion of sample density in the feature space. Then we provide theoretical analyses of the sample
density induced by the SCE loss and its variants. Finally, we propose our new Max-Mahalanobis
center (MMC) loss and demonstrate its superiority compared to previous losses.
3.1 Sample density in the feature space
Given a training dataset D with N input-label pairs, and the feature mapping Z trained by the
objective L(Z(x), y) on this dataset, we define the sample density nearby the feature point z = Z(x)
following the similar definition in physics [27] as
SD(z) =
∆N
Vol(∆B)
. (2)
Here Vol(·) denotes the volume of the input set, ∆B is a small neighbourhood containing the feature
point z, and ∆N = |Z(D) ∩∆B| is the number of training points in ∆B, where Z(D) is the set
of all mapped features for the inputs in D. In the training procedure, the feature distribution is
directly induced by the training loss L, where minimizing the loss value is the only supervisory
signal for the feature points to move [17]. This means that the sample density varies mainly along
the orthogonal direction w.r.t. the loss contours, while the density along a certain contour could
be approximately considered as the same. For example, in the right panel of Fig. 1, the sample
density induced by our MMC loss (detailed in Sec. 3.3) changes mainly along the radial direction,
where the loss contours are concentric circles. Therefore, supposing L(Z(x), y) = C, we choose
∆B = {z ∈ Rd |L(z, y) ∈ [C,C + ∆C]}, where ∆C > 0 is a small value. Then Vol(∆B) is the
volume between the loss contours of C and C + ∆C for label y in the feature space.
3
3.2 The sample density induced by the generalized SCE loss
To better understand how the SCE loss and its variants [41, 53] affect the sample density in the feature
space, we first generalize the definition in Eq. (1) as:
Lg-SCE(Z(x), y) = −1>y log [S(h)], (3)
where the logit h = H(z) ∈ RL is a general transformation of the feature z, for example, h = Wz+b
in the SCE loss. We call this family of losses as the generalized SCE (g-SCE) loss. Wan et al. [53]
propose the large-margin Gaussian Mixture (L-GM) loss, where hi = −(z−µi)>Σi(z−µi)−mδi,y
under the assumption that the learned features z distribute as a mixture of Gaussian. Here µi and
Σi are extra trainable means and covariance matrices respectively, m is the margin, and δi,y is
the indicator function. Pang et al. [41] propose the Max-Mahalanobis linear discriminant analysis
(MMLDA) loss, where hi = −‖z − µ∗i ‖22 under the similar mixture of Gaussian assumption, but the
main difference is that µ∗i are not trainable, but calculated before training with optimal inter-class
dispersion. These two losses both fall into the family of the g-SCE loss with quadratic logits:
hi = −(z − µi)>Σi(z − µi) +Bi, (4)
where Bi are the bias variables. Besides, note that for the SCE loss, there is
S(Wz + b)i =
exp(W>i z + bi)∑
l∈[L] exp(W
>
l z + bl)
=
exp(−‖z − 12Wi‖22 + bi + 14‖Wi‖22)∑
l∈[L] exp(−‖z − 12Wl‖22 + bl + 14‖Wl‖22)
. (5)
According to Eq. (4), the SCE loss can also be regraded as a special case of the g-SCE loss with
quadratic logits, where µi = 12Wi, Bi = bi +
1
4‖Wi‖22 and Σi = I are identity matrices. Therefore,
later when we refer to the g-SCE loss, we assume that the logits are quadratic as in Eq. (4) by default.
To provide a formal representation of the sample density induced by the g-SCE loss, we first derive
the formula of the contours, i.e., the closed-form solution of Lg-SCE(Z(x), y) = C in the space of z,
where C ∈ (0,+∞) is a given constant. Let Ce = exp(C) ∈ (1,+∞), from Eq. (3), we have:
log
(
1+
∑
l 6=y exp(hl)
exp(hy)
)
=C =⇒ hy=log
∑
l 6=y
exp(hl)
− log(Ce−1). (6)
The function in Eq. (6) does not provide an intuitive closed-form solution for the contours, since
the existence of the term log
[∑
l 6=y exp(hl)
]
. However, note that this term belongs to the family of
Log-Sum-Exp (LSE) function, which is a smooth approximation to the maximum function [38, 40].
Therefore, we can locally approximate the function in Eq. (6) with the equation:
hy − hyˆ = − log(Ce − 1), (7)
where yˆ = arg maxl 6=y hl. Then we can define Ly,yˆ(z) = log[exp(H(z)yˆ−H(z)y)+1] as the local
approximation of the g-SCE loss nearby the feature point z, and substitute the neighborhood ∆B by
∆By,yˆ = {z ∈ Rd |Ly,yˆ(z) ∈ [C,C + ∆C]}. For simplicity, we assume scaled identity covariance
matrix in Eq. (4), i.e., Σi = σiI , where σi > 0 are scalars. Through simple derivations (detailed
in Appendix A.1), we show that if σy 6= σyˆ, the solution of Ly,yˆ(z) = C is a (d−1)-dimensional
hypersphere with the centerMy,yˆ = (σy−σyˆ)−1(σyµy−σyˆµyˆ); otherwise, the hypersphere-shape
contour will degenerate to a hyperplane. Since the approximation in Eq. (7) depends on the specific y
and yˆ, we denote the subsetDk,kˆ = {(x, y) ∈ D|y = k, yˆ = kˆ} andNk,kˆ = |Dk,kˆ|. Intuitively,Dk,kˆ
includes the data with the true label of class k, while the highest prediction returned by the classifier
is class kˆ among other classes. In the training process, let Ck,kˆ =
1
Nk,kˆ
∑
(x,y)∈Dk,kˆ Lg-SCE(Z(x), y)
be the averaged g-SCE loss in the subset Dk,kˆ. Then we can derive the approximated sample density
in the feature space induced by the g-SCE loss, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (Proof in Appendix A.1) Assuming that for the input-label pair inDk,kˆ, there is Lg-SCE ∼
N (Ck,kˆ, S2k,kˆ). Given (x, y) ∈ Dk,kˆ, z = Z(x) and Lg-SCE(z, y) = C, if there are Σk = σkI ,
Σkˆ = σkˆI , and σk 6= σkˆ, then the sample density based on the approximation in Eq. (7) is
SD(z) ∝
Nk,kˆϕ(
C−Ck,kˆ
Sk,kˆ
)
Sk,kˆ
[
Bk,kˆ +
log(Ce−1)
σk−σkˆ
] d−1
2
, where Bk,kˆ=
σkσkˆ‖µk−µkˆ‖22
(σk−σkˆ)2
+
Bk−Bkˆ
σk−σkˆ
(8)
and ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution.
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Remark 1. If σk = σkˆ (e.g., as in the SCE loss), the features with loss values in [C,C+ ∆C] will be
encouraged to locate between two hyperplane contours without further supervision, and consequently
there will not be explicit supervision on the sample density as shown in the left panel of Fig. 1.
Remark 2. Based on the conclusion in Theorem 1, we find that there are some inherent limitations
of the g-SCE loss. Under the approximation in Eq. (7), let C∗ = log(1 + exp(Bk,kˆ(σkˆ − σk))) and
C∗e = exp(C
∗), such that Bk,kˆ +
log(C∗e−1)
σk−σkˆ = 0. According to Appendix A.1, if σk > σkˆ, then C
∗
will act as a tight lower bound for C, i.e., the solution set of C < C∗ is empty. This will make the
training procedure tend to avoid this case since the loss C cannot be further minimized to zero, which
will introduce unnecessary biases on the returned predictions. On the other hand, if σk < σkˆ, C could
be minimized to zero. However, when C → 0, the sample density will also tend to zero since there is
Bk,kˆ +
log(Ce−1)
σk−σkˆ →∞, which means the feature point will be encouraged to go further and further
from the hypersphere centerMk,kˆ only to make the loss value C be lower. This is counter-intuitive
since the points with low loss values have to sparsely spread over the space. In practice, the feature
point will not move to infinity, since the existence of batch normalization (BN) layers [26], and the
squared radius from the centerMk,kˆ increases as O(| logC|) when minimizing the loss C. These
theoretical conclusions are consistent with the empirical observations on the two-dimensional features
in previous work [34, 53, 54]. Another limitation of the g-SCE loss is that the sample density is
proportional to Nk,kˆ, which is on average N/L
2. For example, there are around 1.3 million training
data in ImageNet [8], but with a large number of classes L = 1, 000, there are averagely less than
two samples in each Dk,kˆ. These limitations inspire us to design the new training loss as in Sec 3.3.
Remark 3. Except for the g-SCE loss, Wen et al. [54] propose the center loss in order to improve the
intra-class compactness of learned features, formulated as LCenter(Z(x), y) = 12‖z − µy‖22. Here the
center µy is updated based on a mini-batch of learned features with label y in each training iteration.
The center loss has to be jointly used with the SCE loss as LSCE + λLCenter, since simply supervise
the DNNs with the center loss will cause the learned features and centers to degrade to zeros [54].
This makes it difficult to derive a closed-form formula for the induced sample density. Furthermore,
the center loss method cannot concentrate on improving intra-class compactness, since it has to seek
for a trade-off between inter-class dispersion and intra-class compactness.
3.3 Max-Mahalanobis center loss
The limitation of the g-SCE loss, e.g., the MMLDA loss (detailed in Remark 4) mainly roots from the
softmax function, which makes the loss value only depend on the relative relation among logits. This
will cause unexpected and unstable supervisory signals on the learned features, as shown in Sec. 3.2.
One way to solve the limitations is to impose more direct and stronger supervision on the features.
Inspired by the above analyses, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis center (MMC) loss as
LMMC(Z(x), y) = 1
2
‖z − µ∗y‖22. (9)
Here µ∗ = {µ∗l }l∈[L] are the centers of the Max-Mahalanobis distribution (MMD) [41]. The MMD
is a mixture of Gaussian distribution with identity covariance matrix and preset centers µ∗, where
‖µ∗l ‖2 = CMM for any l ∈ [L], and CMM is a hyperparameter. These MMD centers are invariable dur-
ing training, which are crafted according to the criterion: µ∗ = arg minµ maxi6=j〈µi, µj〉. Intuitively,
this criterion is to maximize the minimal angle between any two centers, which can provide optimal
inter-class dispersion as shown in [41]. Behind the simple formula, the MMC loss can explicitly
monitor inter-class dispersion by the hyperparameter CMM, while enabling the network to concentrate
on minimizing intra-class compactness in training to produce high-density regions around the centers
µ∗, as shown in the right panel of Fig. 1. To formally demonstrate this property, we derive the sample
density in the feature space induced by the MMC loss, as stated below:
Theorem 2. (Proof in Appendix A.2) Assuming that for the input-label pair in Dk, there is LMMC ∼
N (Ck, S2k), then given (x, y) ∈ Dk, z = Z(x) and LMMC(z, y) = C, the sample density is
SD(z) ∝ Nkϕ(
C−Ck
Sk
)
SkC
d−1
2
, (10)
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution.
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Similar to the previously introduced notations, here we denote the subset Dk = {(x, y) ∈ D|y = k}
and Nk = |Dk|. In the training process, we let Ck = 1Nk
∑
(x,y)∈Dk LMMC(Z(x), y) be the averaged
MMC loss in the subset Dk. According to Theorem 2, there are attractive merits of the MMC loss
compared to the g-SCE loss. First, the sample density here is proportional to Nk rather than Nk,kˆ,
where Nk is on average N/L. It facilitates producing larger sample density. Second, when the loss
value C is minimized to zero, the sample density will exponentially increase according to Eq. (10).
The right panel of Fig. 1 provides an intuitive insight on this property of the MMC loss: Since the
loss value C is proportional to the squared distance from the preset center µ∗y, the feature points
with lower loss values are certain to locate in a smaller volume around the center. Consequently, the
feature points of the same class are encouraged to gather around the corresponding center, such that
for each sample, there will be more other samples in its neighborhood, which leads to locally robust
predictions [46]. Therefore, the MMC loss value becomes a reliable metric of the uncertainty on
returned predictions. Besides, the MMC loss can naturally avoid the degradation problem encountered
in the center loss, since the preset centers µ∗ are untrainable. These properties of the MMC loss lead
to a considerable improvement on robustness and faster convergence rate in the training procedure
compared to the other losses, as shown in our experiments. In the test phase, the network can still
return a normalized prediction with the softmax function. In Appendix B.1, we provide the generation
algorithm for µ∗. In Appendix B.2, we discuss on why the squared-error form in Eq. (9) is preferred
compared to, e.g., the absolute form or the Huber form [15] in the adversarial setting. We further
introduce flexible variants of the MMC loss in Appendix B.3, which can better adapt to various tasks.
Remark 4. Pang et al. [41] propose a Max-Mahalanobis linear discriminant analysis (MMLDA)
method, which assume the features to distribute as a MMD. Due to the Gaussian mixture assumption,
the training loss for the MMLDA method is obtained by the Bayes’ theorem as
LMMLDA(Z(x), y) = − log
 exp(−‖z−µ∗y‖222 )∑
l∈[L] exp(−‖z−µ
∗
l ‖22
2 )
 = − log [ exp(z>µ∗y)∑
l∈[L] exp(z>µ
∗
l )
]
. (11)
Note that there is Σi = 12I in Eq. (4) for the MMLDA loss, similar with the SCE loss. Thus the
MMLDA method cannot explicitly supervise on the sample density and induce high-density regions
in the feature space, as analyzed in Sec. 3.2. Compared to the MMLDA method, the MMC loss
introduces extra supervision on intra-class compactness, which facilitates better robustness.
4 Experiments
In this section, we empirically demonstrate several attractive merits of applying the MMC loss. We
experiment on the widely used MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets [30, 33]. Since the
existing defenses can already provide satisfactory robustness on MNIST [36, 45, 48, 56], we mainly
demonstrate the results on CIFAR-10 in our experiments. The results on CIFAR-100 are detailed in
Appendix C. The code for implementing our experiments is provided in the supplementary material.
4.1 Performance on the clean inputs
The network architecture applied is ResNet-47 [21] with five core layer blocks. Here we use MMC-10
to indicate the MMC loss with CMM = 10, where CMM is assigned based on the cross-validation
results in [41]. The hyperparameters for the center loss, L-GM loss and the MMLDA method all
follow the settings in the original papers [41, 53, 54]. The pixel values are scaled to the interval
[0, 1]. For each training loss with or without the AT mechanism, we apply the Adam [29] optimizer
with the initial learning rate of 0.001, and train for 40 epochs on MNIST, 180 epochs on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100. When applying the AT mechanism [36], the adversarial examples for training are
crafted by 10-steps targeted or untargeted PGD with  = 8/255. In Fig 2 (a), we provide the curves
of the test error rate w.r.t. the training time. Note that the MMC loss induces faster convergence
rate and requires little extra computation compared to the SCE loss and its variants, while keeping
state-of-the-art performance on the clean images. In comparison, implementing the AT mechanism is
computationally expensive in training and will largely sacrifice the accuracy on the clean images.
4.2 Adaptive attacks for the MMC loss
As stated in [5], only applying the existing attacks with default hyperparameters is not sufficient to
claim reliable robustness. Thus, we apply the adaptive versions of existing attacks when evading
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Table 1: Classification accuracy (%) on the white-box adversarial examples crafted on the test set of CIFAR-10. The superscript tar indicates
targeted attacks, while un indicates untargeted attacks. The subscripts indicate the number of iteration steps when performing attacks. The
results w.r.t the MMC loss are reported under the adaptive versions of different attacks. The notation≤ 1 represents accuracy less than 1%.
Perturbation  = 8/255 Perturbation  = 16/255
Methods Clean PGDtar10 PGD
un
10 PGD
tar
50 PGD
un
50 PGD
tar
10 PGD
un
10 PGD
tar
50 PGD
un
50
SCE [20] 92.9 ≤ 1 4.1 ≤ 1 4.0 ≤ 1 2.9 ≤ 1 2.6
Center [54] 92.8 ≤ 1 4.4 ≤ 1 4.3 ≤ 1 3.1 ≤ 1 2.9
MMLDA [41] 92.4 ≤ 1 16.5 ≤ 1 9.7 ≤ 1 6.7 ≤ 1 5.5
L-GM [53] 92.5 37.6 19.8 8.9 4.9 26.0 11.0 2.5 2.8
MMC-10 92.0 47.7 31.0 20.6 17.3 36.8 19.4 6.9 10.8
ATtar10 (SCE) [36] 83.7 70.6 49.7 69.8 47.8 48.4 26.7 31.2 16.0
ATtar10 (MMC-10) 82.6 67.0 54.8 66.0 53.5 51.9 47.3 38.0 45.1
ATun10 (SCE) [36] 80.7 70.9 57.6 70.4 56.4 54.5 36.3 39.7 22.6
ATun10 (MMC-10) 81.0 70.4 56.3 70.1 55.0 54.7 37.0 39.5 26.3
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Figure 2: (a) Test error rates on clean images w.r.t training time on CIFAR-10. Here AT refers to 10-steps targeted PGD adversarial training,
i.e., ATtar10. (b) Two-dimensional visualization of the attacks on trained MMC networks in the feature space of MNIST. For each attack there is
 = 0.3 with step size of 0.01. The total number of iteration steps is 50, where Iter-n indicates the perturbed features at n-th iteration step.
the networks trained by the MMC loss (detailed in Appendix B.4). For instance, the non-adaptive
objectives for PGD are variants of the SCE loss [36], while the adaptive objectives are −LMMC(z, y)
and LMMC(z, yt) in the untargeted and targeted modes for PGD, respectively. Here yt is the target
label. To verify that the adaptive attacks are more effective than the non-adaptive ones, we modify the
network architecture with a two-dimensional feature layer and visualize the PGD attacking procedure
in Fig 2 (b). The two panels separately correspond to two randomly selected clean inputs. The 10
clusters in each panel consist of the features of all the 10,000 test samples in MNIST, where each
color corresponds to one class. We can see that the adaptive attacks are indeed much more efficient.
4.3 Performance under the white-box attacks
We first investigate the white-box l∞ distortion setting using the PGD attack, and report the results
in Table 1. According to [5], we evaluate under different combinations of the attacking parameters:
the perturbation , iteration steps, and the attack mode, i.e., targeted or untargeted. Following the
setting in [36], we choose the perturbation  = 8/255 and 16/255, with the step size be 2/255. From
the results in Table 1, the MMC loss can significantly improve robustness even under the adaptive
attacks. When combining with the AT mechanism, the trained models have better performance under
unseen attacks, i.e., the attacks different from the one used to craft adversarial examples for training.
Then we investigate the white-box l2 distortion setting. We apply the C&W attack, where it has a
binary search mechanism to find the minimal distortion to successfully mislead the classifier under
the untargeted mode, or successfully lead the classifier to predict the target label in the targeted
mode. Following the suggestion in [3], we set the binary search steps to be 9 with the initial constant
c = 0.01. The iteration steps for each value of c are set to be 1,000 with the learning rate of 0.005. In
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Table 2: Experiments on CIFAR-10. Part I: Averaged l2 distortion of the white-box adversarial examples crafted by C&W with 1,000 iteration
steps. The pixel values are in [0, 1]. Part II: Classification accuracy (%) under the block-box SPSA attack. Part III: Classification accuracy
(%) under general transformations. The standard deviation σ for the Gaussian noise is 0.05, the degree range is±30◦ for random rotation.
Part I Part II (=8/255) Part II (=16/255) Part III
Methods C&Wtar C&Wun SPSAtar10 SPSA
un
10 SPSA
tar
10 SPSA
un
10 Noise Rotation
SCE 0.12 0.07 12.3 1.2 5.1 ≤ 1 52.0 83.5
Center 0.13 0.07 21.2 6.0 10.6 2.0 55.4 84.9
MMLDA 0.17 0.10 25.6 13.2 11.3 5.7 57.9 84.8
L-GM 0.23 0.12 61.9 45.9 46.1 28.2 59.2 82.4
MMC-10 0.29 0.16 69.5 56.9 57.2 41.5 68.0 87.2
ATtar10 (SCE) 1.19 0.63 81.6 67.8 77.9 59.4 82.2 76.0
ATtar10 (MMC-10) 1.78 0.80 79.1 69.2 72.5 62.0 83.5 74.1
ATun10 (SCE) 1.26 0.68 78.8 67.0 73.7 60.3 78.9 73.7
ATun10 (MMC-10) 1.40 0.71 78.6 68.7 74.2 61.0 80.3 75.8
MIM10
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Figure 3: Classification accuracy under the black-box transfer-based attacks on the test set of CIFAR-10. The substitute model refers to the one
used to craft adversarial examples, and the target model is the one that an adversary actually intends to fool. Here AT refers to ATtar10.
the Part I of Table 2, we report the minimal distortions found by the C&W attack. As expected, it
requires much larger distortions to successfully evade the networks trained by the MMC loss.
4.4 Performance under the black-box attacks
As suggested in [1], providing evidence of being robust against the black-box attacks is critical to
claim reliable robustness. We first perform the transfer-based attacks using PGD and MIM. Since
the targeted attacks usually have poor transferability [32], we only focus on the untargeted mode in
this case, and the results are shown in Fig. 3. We further perform the gradient-free attacks using the
SPSA method and report the results in the Part II of Table 2. To perform numerical approximations
on gradients in SPSA, we set the batch size to be 128, the learning rate is 0.01 and the step size of
finite difference is δ = 0.01, as suggested by [52]. These results indicate that training with the MMC
loss also leads to robustness under the black-box attacks, which verifies that our method can induce
reliable robustness, rather than the false one caused by, e.g., gradient mask [1].
4.5 Performance under the general-purpose attacks
To show that our method is generally robust, we further test under the general-purpose attacks [5]. We
apply the Gaussian noise [13, 16] and rotation transformation [12], which are not included in the data
augmentation for training. The results are given in the Part III of Table 2. Note that the AT methods
are less robust to simple transformations like rotation, as also observed in previous work [12]. In
comparison, the models trained by the MMC loss are still robust to these easy-to-apply attacks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the MMC loss to induce high-density regions in the feature space, and
empirically demonstrate several favorable merits of our method: (i) Lead to reliable robustness even
under strong adaptive attacks; (ii) Keep state-of-the-art performance on clean inputs; (iii) Introduce
little extra computation; (iv) Compatible with the existing defense mechanisms, e.g., the AT methods.
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A Proof
In this section, we provide the proof of the theorems proposed in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
According to the definition of sample density
SD(z) =
∆N
Vol(∆B)
,
we separately calculate ∆N and Vol(∆B). Since Lg-SCE ∼ N (Ck,kˆ, S2k,kˆ) for the data points in
Dk,kˆ, recall that ∆B = {z ∈ Rd |Lg-SCE ∈ [C,C + ∆C]}, then there is
∆N = |Z(Dk,kˆ) ∩∆B|
=
Nk,kˆϕ(
C−Ck,kˆ
Sk,kˆ
)
Sk,kˆ
·∆C,
(12)
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution. Now we calculate
Vol(∆B) by approximating it with Vol(∆By,yˆ). We first derive the solution of Ly,yˆ = C. For
simplicity, we assume scaled identity covariance matrix, i.e., Σi = σiI , where σi > 0 are scalars.
Then ∀i, j ∈ [L], c is any constant, if σi 6= σj , the solution of hi − hj = c is a (d−1)-dimensional
hypersphere embedded in the d-dimensional space of the feature z:
‖z−Mi,j ‖22 = Bi,j −
c
σi−σj , where Mi,j=
σiµi−σjµj
σi−σj , Bi,j=
σiσj‖µi−µj‖22
(σi−σj)2 +
Bi−Bj
σi−σj . (13)
Note that each value of c corresponds to a specific contour, where Mi,j and Bi,j can be regraded
as constant w.r.t. c. When Bi,j < (σi − σj)−1c, the solution set becomes empty. Specially, if
σi = σj = σ, the hypersphere-shape contour will degenerate to a hyperplane: z>(µi − µj) =
1
2
[‖µi‖22 − ‖µj‖22 + σ−1(Bj −Bi + c)]. For example, for the SCE loss, the solution of the contour
is z>(Wi −Wj) = bj − bi + c. For more general Σi, the conclusions are similar, e.g., the solution
in Eq. (13) will become a hyperellipse. Now it easy to show that the solution of Ly,yˆ = C when
y = k, yˆ = kˆ is the hypersphere:
‖z −Mk,kˆ ‖22 = Bk,kˆ +
log(Ce − 1)
σk − σkˆ
. (14)
According to the formula of the hypersphere surface area [35], the volume of ∆By,yˆ is
Vol(∆By,yˆ) =
2pi
d
2
Γ(d2 )
(
Bk,kˆ +
log(Ce − 1)
σk − σkˆ
) d−1
2
·∆C, (15)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. Finally we can approximate the sample density as
SD(z) ≈ ∆N
∆By,yˆ
∝
Nk,kˆϕ(
C−Ck,kˆ
Sk,kˆ
)
Sk,kˆ
[
Bk,kˆ +
log(Ce−1)
σk−σkˆ
] d−1
2
.
(16)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, there is
∆N = |Z(Dk) ∩∆B|
=
Nkϕ(
C−Ck
Sk
)
Sk
·∆C,
(17)
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where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of standard normal distribution. Unlike for the g-SCE,
we can exactly calculate Vol(∆B) for the MMC loss. Note that the solution of LMMC = C is the
hypersphere:
‖z − µ∗y‖22 = 2C. (18)
According to the formula of the hypersphere surface area [35], we have
Vol(∆B) =
2
d+1
2 pi
d
2C
d−1
2
Γ(d2 )
·∆C, (19)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. Finally we can obtain the sample density as
SD(z) =
∆N
∆B
∝ Nkϕ(
C−Ck
Sk
)
SkC
d−1
2
.
(20)
B Technical details
In this section, we provide more technical details we applied in our paper.
B.1 Generation algorithm for the Max-Mahalanobis centers
We give the generation algorithm for crafting the Max-Mahalanobis Centers in Algorithm 1, proposed
by Pang et al. [41]. Note that there are two minor differences from the originally proposed algorithm.
First is that in [41] they use C = ‖µi‖22, while we use CMM = ‖µi‖2. Second is that we denote
the feature z ∈ Rd, while they denote z ∈ Rp. The Max-Mahalanobis centers generated in the
low-dimensional cases are quite intuitive and comprehensible. For examples, when L = 2, the
Max-Mahalanobis centers are the two vertexes of a line segment; when L = 3, they are the three
vertexes of an equilateral triangle; when L = 4, they are the four vertexes of a regular tetrahedron.
Algorithm 1 GenerateMMcenters
Input: The constant CMM, the dimension of vectors d and the number of classes L. (L ≤ d+ 1)
Initialization: Let the L mean vectors be µ∗1 = e1 and µ∗i = 0d, i 6= 1. Here e1 and 0d separately
denote the first unit basis vector and the zero vector in Rd.
for i = 2 to L do
for j = 1 to i− 1 do
µ∗i (j) = −[1 + 〈µ∗i , µ∗j 〉 · (L− 1)]/[µ∗j (j) · (L− 1)]
end for
µ∗i (i) =
√
1− ‖µ∗i ‖22
end for
for k = 1 to L do
µ∗k = CMM · µ∗k
end for
Return: The optimal mean vectors µ∗i , i ∈ [L].
B.2 Why the squared-error form is preferred
In the feature space, penalizing the distance between the features and the prefixed centers can be
regarded as a regression problem. In the MMC loss, we apply the squared-error form as ‖z − µ∗y‖22.
Other substitutes could be the absolute form ‖z − µ∗y‖2 or the Huber form. As stated in [15], the
absolute form and the Huber form are more resistant to the noisy data (outliers) or the misspecification
of the class labels, especially in the data mining applications. However, in the classification tasks that
we focus on in this paper, the training data is clean and reliable. Thus the squared-error form can lead
to state-of-the-art accuracy with faster convergence rate compared to other forms. Furthermore, in
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the adversarial setting, the adversarial examples have similar properties as the outliers. When we
apply the AT mechanism in the training procedure, we expect the classifiers to pay more attention
to the adversarial examples, i.e., the outliers. Note that this goal is the opposite of it in the data
mining applications, where outliers are intended to be ignored. Therefore, due to the sensitivity to the
outliers, the squared-error form can better collaborate with the AT mechanism to improve robustness.
Besides, the MMC loss can naturally perform stronger AT mechanism without additional regularizer
term. Specifically, let x be the clean input, x∗ be the adversarial example crafted based on x, then in
the adversarial logit pairing (ALP) method [28], there is an extra regularizer except for SCE as:
‖z(x)− z(x∗)‖22. (21)
When adding x∗ as an extra training point for MMC, then the MMC loss will minimize ‖z(x) −
µ∗y‖22 + ‖z(x∗) − µ∗y‖22, which is an upper bound for 12‖z(x) − z(x∗)‖22. Thus performing naive
adversarial training [18, 36] with MMC is equivalent to performing stronger adversarial training
variants like ALP. As analyzed above, the squared-error form in the MMC loss can accelerate the
convergence of the AT mechanism, since the objective is sensitive to the crafted adversarial examples.
B.3 Variants of the MMC loss
In the MMC loss, we encourage the features to gather around the preset Max-Mahalanobis (MM)
centers µ∗ = {µ∗l }l∈[L], which leads to many attractive properties. However, this ’hard’ supervision,
which induces quite an orderly feature distribution may beyond the reach of the model capability,
especially when the classification tasks themselves are already challenging to learn, e.g., ImageNet [8].
Therefore, we propose potential variants of the MMC loss that could probably solve the problem and
make our method more adaptable. We leave the experimental investigations as future work.
Note that the MMC loss can be regarded as minimizing the negative log likelihood (NLL) of
− log(P (z|y)), where the conditional feature distribution is modeled as z|y ∼ N (µ∗y, I). As
described above, this distribution model may not be easy to learn by the DNNs in some cases. Thus,
we construct a softer model: z|y, µy ∼ N (µy, I) and µy ∼ N (µ∗y, αI), where α > 0 is a scalar.
Here we give the feature center µy a prior distribution, while the prior is centered at µ∗y . Intuitively, we
relax the constraint that the features have to gather around µ∗y . Instead, we encourage the features to
gather around a substitute µy , while µy should be in the vicinity of µ∗y . In the training, we minimize
the joint NLL of − log(P (z, µy|y)) = − log(P (z|y, µy)) − log(P (µy)), which is equivalent to
minimize the what we call elastic Max-Mahalanobis center (EMC) loss as:
LEMC(Z(x), y) = 1
2
‖z − µy‖2 + 1
2α
‖µy − µ∗y‖2. (22)
Here µ = {µl}l∈[L] are simply extra trainable parameters, the prior variance α is a hyperparameter.
When α → 0, the EMC loss degenerates to the MMC loss. Note that although µ∗l are all on the
hypersphere {z ∈ Rd |‖z‖ = CMM}, the support sets of µl are the entire feature space Rd.
Further improvement can be made w.r.t. the MM centers µ∗. An implicit assumption behind the
generation process of µ∗ is that any two classes are mutually independent. This assumption could be
approximately true for MNIST and CIFAR-10, but for more complex datasets, e.g., CIFAR-100 or
ImageNet, this assumption may not be appropriate since there are structures in the relation among
classes. These structures can usually be visualized by a tree. To solve this problem, we introduce the
hierarchical Max-Mahalanobis (HM) centers µH = {µHl }l∈[L], which adaptively craft the centers
according to the tree structure. Specifically, we first assign a virtual center (i.e., the origin) to the root
node. For any child node nc in the tree, we denote its parent node as np, and the number of its brother
nodes as Lc. We locally generate a set of MM centers as µ(s,Lc) = GenerateMMcenters(Cs, d, Lc),
where s is the depth of the child node nc, Cs is a constant with smaller values for larger s. Then we
assign the virtual center to each child node of np from µnp + µ
(s,Lc), i.e., a shifted set of crafted
MM centers, where µnp is the virtual center assigned to np. If the child node nc is a leaf node, i.e., it
correspond to a class label l, then there is µHl = µnc . For example, in the CIFAR-100 dataset, there
are 20 superclasses, with 5 classes in each superclass. We first craft 20 MM centers as µ(1,20) =
GenerateMMcenters(C1, d, 20) and 5 MM centers as µ(2,5) = GenerateMMcenters(C2, d, 5), where
C2  C1. Note that µ(2,5) could be different for each superclass, e.g., by a rotation transformation.
Then if the label l is the j-th class in the i-th superclass, there is µHl = µ
(1,20)
i + µ
(2,5)
j .
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B.4 Adaptive objectives and the induced attacking mechanisms
We apply the adaptive versions of existing attacks when evading the networks trained by the MMC
loss. We separately design two adaptive adversarial objectives LAda to minimize under the untargeted
mode: Lun,1Ada = −LMMC(z, y); Lun,2Ada = LMMC(z, yˆ)−LMMC(z, y), and under the targeted mode:
Ltar,1Ada =LMMC(z, yt); Ltar,2Ada =LMMC(z, yt)−LMMC(z, y), where yt is the targeted label, yˆ is generally
the highest predicted label except for y as defined in Sec. 3.2. These objectives refer to previous work
by Carlini and Wagner [3, 4]. Specifically, the adaptive objectives Ltar,1Ada and Lun,1Ada are used in the
PGD, MIM and SPSA attacks, while the objectives Ltar,2Ada and Lun,2Ada are used in the C&W attacks. In
Fig. 4, we demonstrate the attacking mechanisms induced by different adaptive adversarial objectives.
Note that we only focus on the gradients and ignore the specific method which implements the attack.
Different adaptive objectives are preferred under different adversarial goals. For examples, when
decreasing the confidence of the true label is the goal, Lun,1Ada is the optimal choice; in order to mislead
the classifier to predict an untrue label or the target label, Lun,2Ada and Ltar,2Ada are the optimal choices,
respectively. Sometimes there are additional detectors, then the adversarial examples generated by
Ltar,1Ada could be assigned to the target label with high confidence by the classifiers.𝜇"∗
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𝑧 Decision	  boundaryDecision	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Figure 4: Intuitive demonstration of the attacking mechanisms under different adaptive objectives. Here y is the original label, yˆ =
argmaxl6=y hl is the label of the nearest other decision region w.r.t. the feature z, and yt is the target label of targeted attacks.
C Experiments on CIFAR-100
In Table 3, we provide the results on CIFAR-100 under the white-box PGD and C&W attacks, and
the black-box gradient-free SPSA attack. Note that targeted PGD or SPSA may not able to fool the
classifier to predict the target label. Compared to the results on CIFAR-10, the averaged distortion of
C&W on CIFAR-100 is larger for a successful targeted attack and is much smaller for a successful
untargeted attack. This is because when only the number of classes increases, e.g., from 10 to 100, it
is easier to achieve a coarse untargeted attack, but harder to make a subtle targeted attack.
Table 3: Classification accuracy (%) and averaged l2 distortion on the white-box adversarial examples crafted on the test set of CIFAR-100.
The superscript tar indicates targeted attacks, while un indicates untargeted attacks. The subscripts indicate the number of iteration steps when
performing attacks. The step size is 2/255. The notation≤ 1 represents accuracy less than 1%.
Perturbation  = 8/255 Averaged l2 distortion
Methods Clean PGDtar10 PGD
un
10 SPSA
tar
10 SPSA
un
10 C&W
tar
1,000 C&W
un
1,000
SCE 72.3 ≤ 1 8.0 14.0 1.9 0.16 0.047
Center 72.8 ≤ 1 10.2 14.7 2.3 0.18 0.048
MMLDA 72.2 ≤ 1 13.9 18.5 5.6 0.21 0.050
L-GM 69.3 15.8 15.3 22.8 7.6 0.31 0.063
MMC-10 68.7 19.3 26.2 27.7 11.3 0.37 0.067
ATtar10 (SCE) 61.1 48.6 34.1 56.6 40.4 1.33 0.38
ATtar10 (MMC-10) 58.6 44.4 39.9 49.4 38.7 1.89 0.52
ATun10 (SCE) 57.4 49.5 32.7 53.8 39.1 1.74 0.47
ATun10 (MMC-10) 54.4 52.0 33.4 51.1 38.2 1.82 0.51
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